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Agent or Bounty Hunter by US State here.
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Bail Enforcement, Bail Recovery, Fugitive Recovery and Bounty Hunting is simply the art of finding and bringing bail-secured fugitives to justice. Bail Enforcement
Agents, Bail Recovery Agents, Fugitive Recovery Agents and Bounty Hunters execute bond forfeitures and failure to appear (FTA) warrants on behalf of the bail bond industry.
They also protect the general public from suspected criminal offenders who may be a danger to your community without additional
cost to the American Taxpayer.
See individual US States, Provinces and Countries for local associations
National Association Of Bail Enforcement
Agents (NABEA)
Bail--
Right of Surety
to Pursue Principal
Who has fled
Introductory
Surety upon a bail bond or other undertaking have the right to
surrender their principal at any time, and to this end may pursue and seize him wherever they may find him, even though that
be in another state. While the law is well settled and hardly open to argument on this point there has been at times a failure
to understand the reason for the rule, and this strictly private right has been confused with the governmental process of
extradition. The two remedies are distinct and independent and are only to be confused through lack of understanding
of the nature of the relationship of bail and principal.
Nature of the Relationship
It is a somewhat common error to suppose that a defendant released
upon bail is thereby relieved from all custody and restraint and is under no obligation except that of appearing in court
at such times during the prosecution of his case as the law requires. Inherent in this mistaken conception is the thought
that the purpose of the device of bail is to recover the penalty of the bond upon default in appearnace. This is the opposite of the truth. The primary purpose of bail is, and always has
been, the retention of control over the defendant to the end that justice might be administered. The modern system is but a development of the common law. It has been called:
" Bail have no power to
arrest the principal in a foreign country. Reese v S.9
Wall, 13. But, as between the states of the American Union,
the bail of one held to answer in one state may arrest the principal in another state, and no requisition is necessary." Salles v. Werener 171 Ill. App. 96.
"In the revalation in which the several states composing the Union stand to each other, the bail in a suit
entered in another state have a right to seize and take the principal in a sister state *** Respublica v. Gaoler of Philadelphia 2 Yeates 263.
"The next inquiry is as to the right of bail to take the princpal out of the state in which the recognizance
was entered into. I do not perceive how any question of jurisdiction can arise here. The power of taking and surrendering
is not exercised under any judicial process, but results from the nature of the undertaking by the bail *** It cannot be questioned
by that bail in the common pleas would have the right to go into any other county in the state to take his principal. This
shows that the jurisdiction of the court in no way controls the jurisdiction of the state affect this right is between the
bail and his principal *** Their authority arises more from contract than from the law, and as between the parties, neither
the jurisdiction of the court nor of the state controls it; and so bail may take the principal in another jurisdiction or
another state, on the ground that a valid contract made in one state is enforceable in another according to the law there.
* * * If the principal is to be consicered as standing in the situation of the prisoner who has escaped from the arrest of
the sheriff, according to the language of one of the cases, can there be any reasonable doubt but a sheriff, in such
case, would have a right to pursue and arrest his prisoner, in a neighboring state; and, by parity of reasoning, bail must
have the like authority." Nicolls v. Ingersoll, 7 Johns, (N.Y.)
145
It will be noticed that the exercise of the right
to arrest has a dual aspect; on the one hand the surety is considered as enforcing a contract, and on the other he is looked
upon as acting as an officer of the court and thus subrogated to some of the rights of the state. The right itself, however,
is in no sense derivative, as has been seen. Proceedings in extradition have become so much the usuual thing that the private
right of the surety has been somewhat overlooked, or even confused witht he former. The distinction is made clear in the later
cases.
Ther right of the surety to recapture his proncipal is not a matter of criminal procedure but arises from the
private undertaking arising fom the funishing of the bond. It is not a right of the state but of the surety. If the State
desires to reclaim a fugitive from his jurisdiction in anotherjurisdiction it must proceed by way of extradition in
default of voluntary return. It cannot invoke the right of surety to seze and surrender his principal, for this is a private
and not a governmental remedy. It is equally true that the surety if he has the right is not required to resort to legal process
to detain his principal for the purpoose of makin surrender. There is no conflict between the rights. Extradition can
only be exercised by the government at teh reqyest of the government. Surrender by bail can be exercised only by the
individaul who is bail. The remedies are separte and distinct. As long as the principal remains wihtin the jurisdiction the
right of the bail to arrest and surrender him with process is conceded. As this right is a private one and not accomplished
through governmental procedure, there would seem to be no obstacle in its exercise wherever the surety finds the principal,
jurisdiction does not enter into the question." In re Van der Alle,185
Fed. 959 * * *
The right of a surety to seize his principal
in another state entitles him to return him to the state he left and where the bond requires his presence. The right of seizures
without the accompanying right of return to the state where the bail was furnished would be without value. " an ancient and extremly vigorous form of suretyship or hostageship, which rendered
the surety liable ot suffer the punishment that was hanging over the head of the released prisoner." 2 Pollock & M. History of Eng. Law, p. 589.
Thus, while in a sense the defendant is given a degree of freedom, in contemplation of the law the
dominion of the court is continued in the person of the surety, and there is no such relaxation or abandonment thereof as
would require new process to reassert. This fundamental concept is essential to an undertaking of the rights which arise out
of the relationship. In but slightly varying language the same idea has been expressed by the courts from early times:
"The
doctorine is well settled that, when bail is given, the principal is regarded as delivered to the custody of the sureties.
Their dominion is a continuance of the original imprisonment. ***Taylor
v> Taintor, 16 Wall, 366, 21 L. ED. 287; Staet v. Lingerflet, 109 N. C. 775, 14 S. E. 75. The books have clearly expressed this idea in regard to the relation of the principal to his bail,
and the authorities are pretty well agreed upon it. A man's bail are looked upon as his jailers of his own choosing, and the
person bailed is , in the eye of the law, for many purposes esteemed to be as much in the prison of the court by which he
is bailed as if he were in the actual custody of the proper jailer." 2 Hawk, P.C. 140 *** It is also said that, when the obligation
of the bail is assumed, the surety becomnes in law not only the jailer of his principal, as his custody is constructively
a continuance of the original imprisionment, but, though he cannot confine him except where actually necessary, and temporarily,
for the purpose of surrender, he is subrogated to all the other rights and means which the state possesses to make his control
of him effective."Pickesimer v. Glazner, 173 N. C. 630,92 S.
E. 700, and see Netrograph Mfg. Co. v. Scrugham 197 N. Y. 377.90 N. E. 962; Com v. Miller, 105 Pa. Super, 56,160 A. 240; C.
J. Sec., Vol. 8, p. 39, n. 74
"Under a bail bond or recognizance
the principal is, upon filing of the bond, released in the custody of his bondsmen. He is still constructively, in the custody
of the law. The dominion of the surety is a continuance of the original imprisonment ." In re Lexington Surety & 1. Co. 272 N. Y. 210,5 N.E. (2nd) 204
The surety, in assuming the obligation of bail, becomes in the law the jailer of his
principal and has custody of him. This custody is merely a continuance of the original imprisonment. The sureties are subrogated
to all rights and means which the state possesses to make the control effective. * * * Crain v. St. Okla.) 90 Pac. (2nd) 954, quoting Am J, Vol. 6, p.112, Sec. 165
"At common law, when bail was given, the principal relieved from the custody of the law, he was regarded,
not as fled entirely, but as transferred to the friendly custody of his bail." State v. Schenck, 138 N.C. 560, 49 S. E. 917.
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